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Peacocke’s A Priori Arguments Against Scepticism 
 
B.J.C. Madison 
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Draft Version – Do Not Cite Without Approval 
 
Abstract:  In The Realm of Reason (2004), Christopher Peacocke develops a 
“generalized rationalism” concerning, among other things, what it is for someone to be 
“entitled”, or justified, in forming a given belief.  In the course of his discussion, 
Peacocke offers two arguments to the best explanation that aim to undermine scepticism 
and establish a justification for our belief in the reliability of sense perception, 
respectively.  If sound, these ambitious arguments would answer some of the oldest and 
most vexing epistemological problems.  In this paper I will evaluate these arguments, 
concluding that they are inconclusive at best.  Despite offering some interestingly 
original arguments, Peacocke gives us no reason to think that scepticism is false, and that 
perception is generally reliable.   
 
In The Realm of Reason (2004), Christopher Peacocke develops a “generalized 
rationalism” concerning, among other things, what it is for someone to be “entitled”, or 
justified, in forming a given belief.  In the course of his discussion, Peacocke offers two 
arguments to the best explanation that aim to undermine scepticism and establish a 
justification for our belief in the reliability of sense perception, respectively.  If sound, 
these ambitious arguments would answer some of the oldest and most vexing 
epistemological problems.  In this paper I will evaluate these arguments, concluding that 
they are inconclusive at best.  Despite offering some interestingly original arguments, 
Peacocke gives us no reason to think that scepticism is false, and that perception is 
generally reliable.   
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1. 
Peacocke’s anti-sceptical arguments are closely related, and in fact share their 
first two premises.  It is perhaps best, therefore, to see the second argument as an 
elaboration of the first.  Peacocke’s argument that we are entitled to believe that we are in 
a non-sceptical world can be summarised as follows: 
1) Experiences with content are complex (Peacocke 2004, 86-7). 
2) A complex phenomenon is more likely to have a complexity-reducing explanation than 
an explanation that does not reduce complexity or no explanation at all (Ibid., 83; 95). 
3) Sceptical explanations of our content-bearing experiences do not reduce complexity 
(Ibid., 90-1).  
4) Our standard explanations of those experiences do reduce complexity (Ibid.). 
 
Therefore, we are entitled to believe that we are in a standard, non-sceptical world. 
  
Much in the argument hangs both on the notion of complexity as well as the complexity-
reduction principle expressed in premise 2.  As Peacocke uses the term, complex 
phenomena are ones that seem improbable but in fact have an explanation of why they 
occur, for example, like the structure of a snowflake (for examples of complexity in his 
sense, see Peacocke 2004, 75-86).  Something is an instance of complexity when the 
range of exemplified properties is narrow compared to the range of all possible 
properties.  To take Peacocke’s example of a snowflake, it exhibits a complex structure, 
since of all the possible ways it could have been, it exhibits six-fold symmetry, rather 
than any other shape.  Perceptual experience is similarly complex in this sense, since a 
perceptual experience exemplifies only a narrow range of possible properties that it could 
have otherwise had.   
Premise 2 embodies a kind of complexity-reduction principle.  Peacocke formulates 
this principle as follows: 
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Complexity Reduction Principle:  Other things equal, good 
explanations of complex phenomena explain the more complex 
phenomena in terms of the less complex; they reduce complexity  
(Peacocke 2004, 83).  (emphasis added) 
 
This principle, which just states a necessary condition of good explanations, is 
immediately followed by the metaphysical principle that I paraphrased in Premise 2: 
Qualified Principle of Sufficient Reason:  Other things equal, it 
is more probable that a complex phenomenon has a complexity-
reducing explanation than that it has no explanation, or that it has 
one that does not reduce complexity (Ibid.). (emphasis added)1  
 
Peacocke takes both of these principles to be knowable a priori.  He tells us that the 
thought behind these principles is that it is more likely that things come about in easier 
ways, and that for the most part, it is more rational to believe that things come about in 
these ways.  Peacocke repeatedly emphasizes throughout his discussion that the notion of 
probability he is interested in is an objective, mind-independent matter. 
 The third and fourth premises of the argument hold that sceptical arguments are 
not complexity-reducing, and so should be rejected in favour of standard natural selection 
explanations as the cause of our perceptual experiences.  According to Peacocke, a 
complexity-reducing explanation is one where the phenomenon appealed to has less 
complexity than the phenomenon to be explained.  The problem with sceptical 
hypotheses is that they allegedly reproduce or multiply the complexity, not reduce it.  
Typical sceptical scenarios are filled with unexplained explainers, such as issues 
concerning the intentions of the evil demon, or why and how random events can give rise 
                                                 
1 One might immediately wonder: if true, does Peacocke’s principle establish that complexity-reducing 
explanations, like being in standard, non-sceptical world, are merely more probable than the sceptical 
alternatives, or considerably more probable than not that we are in a normal world?  The former seems too 
weak to provide us with justification for believing that we are in such a world, and as I will argue below, 
the stronger conclusion does not follow from his premises.   
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to our perceptual experiences.  So, given the need to explain our perceptual experience, 
and given the alleged inadequacy of sceptical scenarios, combined with a qualified 
version of the principle of sufficient reason, Peacocke concludes by inference to the best 
(complexity-reducing) explanation that we are entitled to believe that we are in a 
standard, non-sceptical world.    
2. 
Before evaluating this argument, I will briefly outline Peacocke’s second anti-
sceptical argument, since it shares the same problems as his first.  The second argument 
is designed to establish that transitions from perceptual experience to perceptual belief 
are likely to result in true judgements in non-sceptical worlds.  This conclusion aims to 
elaborate the conclusion of the first argument by showing that not only are we entitled to 
believe that we are in non-sceptical world, but that the perceptual beliefs we form are 
usually true.  Peacocke’s argument for the reliability of sense perception can be 
summarized as follows:   
1) Perceptual experiences are complex  (Peacocke 2004, 86-87). 
2) A complex phenomenon is more likely to have a complexity-reducing explanation than 
an explanation that does not reduce complexity or no explanation at all (Ibid., 83; 95). 
3) A natural selection explanation of the occurrence of perceptual experiences is 
complexity-reducing  (Ibid., 87-8; 98).  
4) It is not clear that any other explanation is complexity-reducing  (Ibid.). 
5) Therefore, a natural selection explanation of the occurrence of perceptual experiences is 
probably true  (from 2, 3, and 4). 
6) A natural selection explanation entails that those experiences are usually veridical. 
 
Therefore, transitions from those experiences to content-endorsing judgements usually result in 
true judgements.  In other words, transitions from perceptual experience to perceptual belief are 
truth-conducive. 
  
Premises 1 and 2 are the same as Peacocke’s first formulation of the anti-sceptical 
argument.  I will grant premises 3 and 4 for the sake of argument.  While premise 6 has 
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been questioned, I will not address it here.2  The most problematic premise is one shared 
by both formulations of the argument: premise 2, the complexity-reducing premise.  
What does seem both a priori and true is the Complexity Reduction Principle that states 
that all else being equal, good explanations of complex phenomena explain the more 
complex phenomena in terms of the less complex.  This is a truth about what makes for 
good explanation.  Notice that this is not necessarily the same thing as a true explanation.  
A good explanation may have moral, aesthetic or pragmatic virtues.  Peacocke surely 
recognizes this, which explains his appeal to his Qualified Principle of Sufficient Reason.   
Recall that this principle is cast in terms of truth, not in terms of what makes for a 
good explanation.  It states that, all else being equal, it is more probable that a complex 
phenomena has a complexity-reducing explanation than that it has no explanation, or that 
it has one that does not reduce complexity.  It is this principle that is required for 
Peacocke’s argument to hold. Peacocke claims that this principle is a priori.  It is not 
analytic, so presumably it is intended as a synthetic a priori truth. Unfortunately, 
however, it is just not clear if this principle is true, so at best it is inconclusive if the 
argument is sound.  
To see why this is so, consider again the six-step reconstruction of Peacocke’s 
argument above.  The overall strategy is as follows: we know, as common sense assures 
us, that many of our explanations are true.  Taking Peacocke’s examples, we know that 
natural selection is the correct explanation of biological evolution, including the 
evolution and proper functioning of our perceptual faculties.  We also take ourselves to 
know why snowflakes form as they do; to add a further example, we know why certain 
                                                 
2 The main argument that questions if evolution (without God’s help) necessarily selects for truth-
conducive cognitive faculties is Plantinga’s so-called “Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism”.  For 
an expression of this argument, and a collection of essays critically evaluating it, see Beilby 2002.  
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treatments cure some diseases rather than others.  Peacocke then notes that what is 
common between these true explanations is that they are complexity-reducing in his 
sense.  So from explanations known to be true on one hand, and a disposition to believe 
that these explanations are complexity reducing on the other, Peacocke reasons that there 
is a (justified) presumption to believe that complexity reduction connects with truth.  
What Peacocke is arguing for is a presumption (albeit a defeasible one) that complexity 
reduction is a sign of truth.  Therefore, providing a single counter-example of a correct 
explanation that increases or reproduces complexity will not count against such a 
presumption.  
However, the first problem with the Qualified Principle of Sufficient Reason and 
the use of complexity-reduction is that we cannot know a priori the correctness of the 
explanations we take ourselves to know that Peacocke appeals to.  Take the explanations 
that we know to be true that Peacocke cites as data for the basis of his inference to the 
best explanation that these (true) explanations are non-accidentally complexity-reducing: 
natural selection in biology, and the six-fold symmetry of snowflakes.  These things are 
both true, and known to be true (common sense tells us), but they are not known a priori.  
To be sure, these are paradigms of success in the empirical sciences, not discoveries that 
could have been made from the armchair.  Accordingly, it is difficult to see how 
Peacocke can gain a priori support for his principle on this manifestly a posteriori basis.   
A second concern is whether we are entitled to take as known the data that 
Peacocke does in this context.  Take the perceptual experience referred to in premise 1, 
for example.  Whose perceptual experience is Peacocke talking about?  His own, or the 
experiences of others as well?  If he is including other’s experiences, too, is he entitled to 
 7
presuppose the existence of other minds at this stage of the argument?  If he is only 
talking about his own experiences, then maybe the correct explanation of them is not one 
in terms of natural selection.  How does he know that he has been around to test the value 
of the experiences?  
Common sense does assure us that we know that, for example, minds other than 
our own exist or that our best evolutionary theory is (at least approximately) true.  This is 
not problematic in an everyday context nor in scientific practice.  However, here 
Peacocke is mounting arguments for the reliability of sense perception, and against the 
possibility of being a brain in vat – in short, Peacocke is offering abductive arguments 
against scepticism.  Since the falsity of scepticism is what he intends to argue we are 
justified in believing, he cannot presuppose the falsity of scepticism by taking it that we 
know the explanations he appeals to are true, e.g. that there have been millions of years 
of evolution, without begging the question. 
The third problem is that the Qualified Principle of Sufficient Reason is intended 
in terms of objective, metaphysical probability, but the kind of possibility that Peacocke 
draws on when trying to garner intuitive support for the principle is epistemic probability.  
It is certainly true that we prefer complexity-reducing explanations, but why is it 
supposed to be true that such explanations are likely to exist?  What Peacocke tends to 
say in support of this are things like the following: 
A good theory must not only explain the occurrence of exper-
iences; it should also explain without extreme improbability and 
without pushing the question back why there is the instantiation 
of just that complex network of relations involved in those 
experiences having the contents they do (Peacocke 2004, 97).  
(emphasis added) 
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The question is, if the kind of improbability is not epistemic, how do we judge a priori if 
the explanation given is improbable or not?  Improbable relative to what?  How could we 
know such a thing? And even if complexity-reduction is ever satisfied, how can we ever 
tell that it is the simplest explanation (and not just one of the simplest explanations)?  It is 
of course easy to tell what seems simple and more complex to us, but the question here is 
justifying the judgement that a given explanation is in fact the simplest one. 
 One possible answer (that would need development and defence) is that 
conceivability, which is an epistemic notion, is somehow a guide to metaphysical 
possibility.  But even if this is true, is it really inconceivable that a complex phenomenon 
has no explanation, or if it does, it cannot be as complex, if not more so, than that which 
it explains?  While perhaps unsatisfying, on the face of it there does not seem to be 
anything inconceivable here, and hence by hypothesis, there is no impossibility.  If this is 
not a reason to think that Peacocke’s principle is true, and his stated defence is 
inadequate, can we find another explanation of why he is misled into thinking that he 
knows the Qualified Principle of Sufficient Reason a priori? 
 The best explanation of why Peacocke unjustifiably thinks that the Qualified 
Principle of Sufficient Reason is necessarily true is that he thinks it follows from a related 
but distinct genuine a priori truth.  Peacocke asserts: “That it is rational to hold that 
things have come about in a way in which they are more likely to have come about seems 
to be an a priori principle” (Peacocke 2004, 83). The implication seems to be that it is a 
rational thing to believe precisely because it is true (perhaps in virtue of meaning alone, 
no less; or at least knowable a priori if the claim is synthetic) that it is more likely that 
things come about in easier, rather than in more improbable or difficult ways.  The 
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difficulty is that one ought to be agnostic about what is an easy way for something to 
come about, given that we are concerned with objective, metaphysical possibilities.  This 
is compounded by the fact that when considering the reliability of sense perception and 
the possibility that we may be brains in a vat, we have no idea what the initial conditions 
are, which renders impossible judgements (let alone a priori judgements) about the ease 
in which things can objectively come about.  Further, the point remains that while it is of 
course easy to tell what seems like the simplest explanation, the difficult question here is 
justifying the judgement that a given explanation is in fact the simplest one.  
In short, the problem with Peacocke’s arguments is that it is just not convincing 
that we can know a priori that the simple is the sign of the true.  But even if it was known 
a priori, difficulties remain in the application of the principle. Without this key premise 
that complexity reduction is a reason to think something is true, he cannot establish that 
we are entitled to believe that we are in a non-sceptical world, or that perception is 
generally reliable.  If the sceptical paradoxes can be given adequate solutions, it is 
unfortunately not with these arguments.3 
 
B.J.C. Madison 
School of Philosophy and Theology 
The University of Notre Dame Australia 
19 Mouat St. (PO Box 1225) 
Fremantle, WA, 6959 
Australia 
                                                 
3 Thanks to a 2008 PhilSoc audience at the ANU’s RSSS Philosophy Program.  Thanks especially to Vickie 
Madison, Mike Martin, Paul Snowdon and Lee Walters for helpful written comments on earlier drafts of 
this paper. 
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